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IN THE SUPRBMB COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OP t11'AH 
---------------------------------------
l JOSEPH TERRY SIEBOLD, I 
Petitioner- I 
Appellant, 
I CASE RO. 
va. 
: 
DIR w. TURBER, 10551 
IARDEll, UTAH STATE I 
PRISCll, 
I 
Re•pondent. 
I 
--------------------------------------
BRIEF 07 APP~ll'l' 
--------------------------------------
J 
I 
I 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
I The petitioner - appellant, Joseph 
I 
(Terry siebold, appeals from a judgment of the 
District court of Salt Lake County, dismissing 
appellants complaint for a writ of habeas cor-
pus against respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
Petitioner - appellant filed a Com-
plaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District 
Coilrt in and for Salt Lake County, on November 
19, 1965. The respondent, John w. Turner, 
Warden of the Utah state Prison, answered the 
I Complaint for writ of Habeas Corpus on the 6th 
day of December, 1966' by and through Phil L. 
1 Hanson, Attorney General of Utah. A pre-trial 
I 
I was held on the 3rd day of December, 1965 and 
-2-
a pre-trial order signed and entered by JUdge 
Aloon J. Anderson on the 7th day of December, 
1%5. on the 6th day of January, 1966, a 
nearing was held on the matter and after making 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on the 
11th day of January, 1966, Judge Aldon J. 
Anderson entered Judgment against petitioner-
appellant, dismissing his Application and Com-
plaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus and denying 
the same. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
Appellant sul:xnits that the JUdgment 
of the trial court should be reversed and his 
Application and Complaint for writ of Habeas 
Corpus should be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 3rd day of August, 1964, appel-
-3-
lant and one Dennis J. Demarais were arrested 
10 Uintah County, state of Utah, and charged 
with the crime of assault with intent to 
corrmit murder, pursuant to Section 76-30-14, 
utah code Annotated, 1953, and charged with 
robbery pursuant to section 76-51-1, Utah 
code Annotated, 1953, (Exhibits D-1 and D-2). 
on August 4, 1964 they were brought before 
Justice of the Peace, R. A. McConkie, where 
the complaints were read to them. {Exhibit 
D-1 and D-2). At that time, appellant was 
without funds with which to retain counsel. 
(R-42). Appellant testified that at the time 
they were brought before the JUstice of the 
Peace no mention was ever made regarding their 
right to counsel. (R-42). County Attorney 
Hammond testified that the JUstice of the 
-4-
' 
peace advised them that if they wanted to 
talk to an attorney they could have time to 
do that. (R-88) • County Attorney Hammond 
also advised them they had a right to confer 
. 
with an attorney but did not tell them that 
they could do so even though they didn't have 
any funds. (R-90). 
Having waived Preliminary Hearing, 
Appellant was bound over to the Fourth JUdi-
cial District court and arraignment was set 
for August 12, 1964. (Exhibits D-1 and D-2). 
On August 12, 1964, defendants were arraigned 
' before the Hon. Joseph E. Nelson in the Fourth 
J\ldicial District court in and for Uintah 
County, state of Utah. (Exhibits D-1 and D-2). 
The court appointed Ray E. Nash, Esq. to re-
present appellant and Demarais on both charges. 
(Exhibits D-1 and 0-2). 
-s-
At the arraigrunent, appellant pleaded 
guilty to the charge of robbery and was re-
manded to the custody of the Uintah County 
sheriff to be delivered to the court on 
september 9, 1964 for pronouncement of judg-
ment (Exhibit D-2). At the arraignment, 
} appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of 
assault with intent to commit murder and was 
remanded to the custody of Uintah County 
Sheriff to be delivered to the court on sep-
tember 9, 1964, for trial. (Exhibit D-1). 
The Fourth Judicial Court, in and for 
Uintah County, State of Utah, the Hon. Maurice 
Harding presiding, pronounced judgment on 
September 9, 1964 on the charge of robbery, 
/ to which appellant had previously pleaded 
I 
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I guilty and sentenced him to be confined in 
the utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
period of not less than five years. (Exhibit 
I o-2). on September 9, 1964, appellant 
J 
changed his plea· on the charge of assault 
with intent to coDBDit murder from not guilty 
I to guilty. (Exhibit D-3). Appellant then 
waived the time for pronouncement of judg-
ment and the court entered Judgment on 
September 9, 1964, that appellant be confined 
in the Utah state Prison for an indeterminate 
period of not less than five years on the 
1 
charge of assault with intent to COlmlit murder. 
(Exhibit o-i) • Appellant was then delivered 
by the Sheriff of Uintah County to the Warden 
of the Utah state Prison for execution of the 
Judgments on both charqes. (R-26). 
-7-
I 
sometime after his arrest on August 
3
1 
1964, and prior to the pronouncement of· 
/Judgment on September 9, 1964, appellant 
I waived extradition proceedings to the State of California and was returned to California 
1 for investigation of murder. California 
I 
authorities did not press the investigation 
for murder and returned appellant to the state 
of Utah where he was arraigned and judgment 
pronounced. There is no evidence or record 
on these facts as the pre-trial order made 
and entered by the Hon. Aldon J. Anderson 
precluded the introduction of evidence as to 
extradition proceedings. (R-9) 
-8-
POINT I. 'l'BE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
IH FINJ;>DlG THAT APPELLANT HAS HOT 
BEEM DEPRZVED OF A STATE OR FEDERAL 
CONSTI'l'U'l'IOBAL RIGHT. 
j Appellants 
I . 
Complaint for Writ of 
J
Babea• Corpus came 
Honorable Aldon J. 
on for hearing before the 
Anderson one of the Judges 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake county. After hearing the teati-
ny of witnesses, receiving exhibits and hear-
ing the arguments of counsel, the Honorable 
.JUdge made his Fi .. inga of Pact and conclusions 
of Law. No finding was made as to when appellant 
waa appointed counsel although the record shows 
~W18el was appointed by the Uintah County 
iatrict court at the arraignment on August 
112, 1964 (Exhibit D-4) , nine daya after appellants 
larre1t on August J, 1964 (Exhibits D-4 and D-2) • The Honorable Judge found in his 
-9-
j conclusions of Law that, M • • • they have 
)been deprived of no state or federal con-
stitutional right." (R-16) Baaed on this 
j conclusion of law, which appellant submits 
\was in error, Judgment was entered in his 
l 
jcomplaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus, dia-
l mi11ing the same. 
I 
It is clear from the record that 
at the time of his arrest and at the time 
he waa taken before JUstice of the Peace 
McConkie, he was without funds with which 
to retain counsel. (R-42) Although it may 
appear that JUatice of the Peace McConkie 
I 
1adviaed appellant of hi• right to counsel, 
it is clear that he was not advised that counsel 
Would be appointed for him if be were without 
I 
1 
funde. (R-90) • 
I Appellant submits that he was de-
\prived of his right to counsel at critical 
I 
-10-
1 stages of the proceedings against him. 
I j without t~e aid of counsel he was required 
' to determine whether or not to waive a pre-
j liminary hearing (a-89) 1 whether or not to 
' 'wive extradition proceedings to the State 
'of california and whether or ·not to waive 
\extradition proceedings back to the State 
\•f utah (the record i• devoid of evidence 
\in this regard due to the pre-trial order JBBde 
~y JUdge Anderson) • (R-8, 9) • These examples 
are only the legal matter• which appellant 
11 confronted with and do not include other 
I 
tter• which may have necessitated the advice 
~f counael. 
t The Sixth Amendment to the tJni ted tate1 Constitution and the constitution of 
t•h, Article I, Section 12, provide•• 
\ 
j -11-
"In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right • • • to 
have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense." 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. 
"?,.J;(c?S. "?3.:.-; _c;.<,,,,q,_ 41 7?/' 
792 (1963), the united States Supreme 
.\court ruled that the right to counsel is 
jl 
,1 one of the fundamental rights of an accused 
~and is obligatory on the states under the 
14th Amendment to the united States Const i-
t tution. In the Gideon case, the court quoted 
~JUstice Southerland in Powell v. Alabama, 
,, 287 u.s. 45, 68, 53 Sup. ct. 55, 64, 77 Law 
}M. 158 (1932) as follows: 
, 
t 
1 
"'l'he right to be heard would 
be in many caaes of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counael. 
Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and aaae-
t imea no akill in the science 
of the law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, general-
ly, of determining for himself 
"whether the indictment is 
good or bad. He ia unfamil-
iar with the rule of evi-
dence. Left without the aid 
of counsel he may be put on 
trial without a proper charge, 
and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to the iaaue or otherwise in-
admissible. He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately 
to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. 
He requires the guiding band 
of counsel at evei:y step in 
the proceedin~s aGainat him. 
without it, t oug he be not 
guilty, he faces the danger of 
conviction because he doe• not 
know how to eatabliah hi• 
innocence." (Emphasis Added). 
Under the decision of the court in 
r------.;..;;......;.;.;:;..-:;..;~~.&.:.h~t, the states are required to 
int counsel for indigent persona in all 
riainal prosecutions. The question of when 
,nindigent peraon ha• the right to have 
~ai1111e1 appointed for him baa been con-
ridered by this court in State v. Braaach, 
I 
I -u-
j19 utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 (1951). There 
~e defendants claimed that they were de-
~rived of their right to counsel at the pre-
iminary hearing. The record showed that 
hey requested counsel be appointed both at 
~e arraignment and at the preliminary hear-
! 
t
g. They were informed that they were 
titled to counsel but that until the case 
to the District Court they would have 
oprocure such services at their own expense 
without the aid of the state. 
In the Braasch case, thi• court 
ated at Page 460: 
"Thus, at the preliminary 
hearing the State ought to 
provide counsel for any 
defendant desiring but un-
able to procure counsel for 
himaelf. Thia should have 
been made clear to the de-
felidanta before they de-
-14-
•cided whether they were 
read' for the hearing.• 
CllliP asis Added). 
'l'he court ultimately held that the 
failure to advise of the right to have 
coun•el for the preliminary hearing, al-l though error, was not prejudicial error. 
I 
since the Braasch decision, the Federal 
courts have more particularly set forth the 
extent of an indigent's right to counsel in 
the early stages of the proceedings against 
him. 
In Harvey v. State of Mis•i•sippi, 
petitioner sought. a Writ of Habeas corpus 
on the ground that he wu_ denied due process. 
'!he petitioner, Sarvey, was convicted Oil the 
I ba1ie of a 
'a11ietance I ldviaed of 
L 
guilty plea entexed without the 
of counsel and without being 
his right to the assistance of 
~ounsel. The court noted that "waiver of 
uch right to counsel M cannot be presumed frcm 
e mere fact that the accused appeared with-
t counsel or failed to request counael • 
. 
v. Cochran, 1962, 369 U.S. 506, 
2 Sup. Ct. 884, 8 Law F.d.2d 701 Daughty v. 
bxwell, 1964, 376 U.S. 202, 84 Sup. Ct. 
l 
02, 11 Law &L 650. 
The court noted at page 269: 
MOne accused of crime baa 
the right to the aaai•taace 
of counsel before entering 
a plea because of the di•-
advantageoua poaition of an 
unaaaiated layman in a court 
of law and because of tbe 
seriou• mn•equencea which -y 
attend a guilty plea. Such 
diaadvantagea and coaaequence• 
.. y weigh as heavily on an 
accused misdemeanant a• on 
an accused felon. The record 
reveals that the guilty plea 
entered in the caae at bar bad 
grievoua c::onaequencea iadeed." 
-16-
I 
I 
\ 
r 
I 
I 
I 
In Hamilton v. State of Alabama, 368 
T • S • 52, 82 Sup. ct. 157 (1961) the united 
tates Supreme court held that the arraign-
the State of Alabama is so critical 
t 
stage in the Alabama criminal procedure 
hat denial of counsel at arraignment required 
reversal of the conviction even though no 
rejudice was shown. The court noted that 
t the time of arraigrunent in Alabama the 
efense of insanity must be pleaded or it is 
oat unless it is accepted at the trial judge• s 
iscretion. The exercise of this discretion 
a not appealable. Also, at the time of 
rraigment pleas in abatement and motions 
~o qua1h must be raiaed. The court atated 
~t Page 158: 
I 
I 
I 
... 
"Whatever may be the function 
and importance.of arraignment 
in other jurisdictions, we have 
said enough to show that in 
-17-
wAlabama it ia a critical 
stage in a criminal proceeding. 
What happens there may affect 
the whole trial. Available 
defenses may be as irretriev-
ably loat, if not then and there 
asaerted, aa they are when an 
accused represented by counsel 
waives a right joratrategic 
purpoaea.w 
The court, quoting from prier Supreme 
I court cases stated: 
wAn accused in a capital case 
requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. With-
out it, though he be not: guilty, 
he faces the danger of con-
vi ction because he does not 
know haw to establish hi• 
innocence. '.l'he guiding_hand 
of counael ia needed at the 
trial lest the unwary concede 
that which only bewilder.eat 
or ignorance could justify er 
pay a penalty which ia greater 
than the law of the state 
exacts for the offe .. e which 
they in fact in law cCllllitted. 
But the same pitfall•, or like 
-18-
ttones, face an accused in 
Alabama who was arraigned 
without counsel at his side. 
When one pleads to a capital 
charge without benefit of 
counsel, we do not stop to 
determine whether prejudice 
resulted. (citing cases) In 
this case, as in those, the 
degree of prejudice can never 
be known. Only the presence 
of counsel CDuld have enabled 
this accused to know all the 
defenses available to him and 
to plead intelligently." 
Upon the foregoing, the United States 
Supreme court reversed the ruling of the Alabama 
Supreme Court • 
In White v. The State of Maryland, 
373 U.S. 59, 83 Sup. ct. 1050, 10 L.F.d. 2d 
193 (1963), the united States Supreme court 
held that under Maryland law the denial of 
I the defendant• s right to counsel at the pre-
! liminary hearing necessitated the reversal 
of his conviction for murder. In that case 
-19-
r 
f• petitioner was arrested and brought 
~fore a Magistrate for a preliminary hear-
g at which time he plead guilty to the charge 
murder. Thereafter, at what Maryland calla 
~ arraigmnent, the petitioner had counsel 
~inted for him and entered a plea of not 
t'lty and not guilty by reason of insanity. ever, at his trial, the plea of guilty made 
his preliminary hearing was introduced in 
'dence against him. It was contended that 
er Maryland Law there was no requirement 
any practicable possibility under the 
11nt criminal p•ocedure to appoint counsel 
the petitioner at the preliminary hearing, 
wats it necessary for the petitioner to 
er a plea at that time. 
The court atated at Page 1051: 
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"Whatever may be the normal 
function of the preliminary 
hearing under Maryland law, 
it was in this case aa criti-
cal a stage as arraignment 
under Alabama law. For 
petitioner entered a plea 
before the Magistrate and that 
plea was taken at the time when 
he had no counsel. 
"We repeat what we said in 
Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, 
at 55, 82 Sup. Ct. at 159, 
that we do not stop to deter-
mine whether prejudice resulted: 
'only the presence of 
counsel could have en-
abled this accused to 
know all the defenses 
available to him and 
to plead intelligently! 
•we therefore hold that Baailton 
v. Ala.ha•• governa and tlii jiidg-
ment 'bilaw must be and i• re-
versed.• 
L Appellant respectfully submits that •r the holdings of Baailton v. Alal>8-, supra, 
~ !!!ti te v. state ef Maryland, appellant '• 
-21-
I 
I 
l 
j 
~rraignment before the Justice of the Peace 
18 such a •critical stage" in the criminal 
roceedings against him as to require the 
As stated in a paper ppointment of counsel. r Ronald I. Meahbeaher1 
"The initial appearance or 
I arraignment before a Magi•-. trate may, in addition to plead-
ing, involve a decision whether 
to waive preliminary examin-
ation and the setting of bail. 
In some situations it might be 
beneficial to waive the prelim-
inary examination, but in moat 
cases it is an excellent device 
for di•covery. In any event, 
the strategy to be employed can 
moat effectively be deterained 
by coun•el. The lawyer may alao 
aid hi• client in •eeing that 
the bail aet is not exceaaive 
or perhaps even have tbe de-
fendant releaaed without bail. 
'l'hua, for purposes of strategy 
or pm aible early release, the 
initial appearance or arraign-
ment is a 'critical stage' and 
under the rational of Hamilton 
and White an offer of appointed 
-22-
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
jea. 
exists a 
"counsel and advising of the 
right to retain counsel is 
constitutionally required." 
The Hennepin, Vol. 35/No.6, p. 
As Professor Kamisar has stated, there 
" • • (G) atehouse of American 
criminal procedure--through 
which most defendants journey 
and beyond which many never get--
(where) the enemy of the state 
is a depersonalized 'subject' 
to be 'sized up' and subjected 
to 'interrogation tactics and 
techniques most appropriate for 
the occaaion'1 he ia 'game' to 
be atalked and cornered. Here 
ideal• are checked at the door, 
'realities• faced, and the pres-
tige of law enforcement vindicated. 
once he leave4 the 'gatehouse' 
and entera the 'manaion'--if he 
ever gets there--the eneay of 
the atate is reperaonalize4, 
even dignified, the public 
invited, and a stirring cere-
mony in honor of individual 
-23-
"freedan fran law enforcement 
celebrated." 
Kamisar, Equal Justice in the 
Gatehouses and Mansions of 
American Criminal Procedure, 
in Kiiilaar, Inbau & Sowle, 
Criminal Justice in Our Time, 
20 (1965) (Magna carta Essays). 
Utah does not cane expressly within 
\the holding of the White case inasmuch as 
'otah does not permit the entering of a plea 
at the preliminary hearing. At that hear-
ing the defendant may make a statement, not 
uader oath, after being informed of hia right 
to remain ailent without risking later caarent 
on hi• ailence .and after being informed of 
the admissibility of a statement against 
him at trial. (utah Code Annotated, Sec. 
77-15-35) However, at the preliminary hear-
in9 and at the request of the prosecutor, 
the Magistrate must order the transcription 
-24-
I 
I 
I 
of testimony which may be admitted at trial, 
thu• possibly depriving the defendant of his 
opportunity for cross examination at a trial 
by jury. As Professor Mazor so ably put it 
) in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 9, p. 68: 
I 
I 
I 
"Even if it be thought that 
characterization of the pre-
liminary examination as 
critical can be avoided 
where no such testimony is 
taken or obviated through 
deletion of this provision, 
there are broader aspects 
of the use of the preliminary 
hearing which suggest the 
necessity of providing 
counsel. Whereas sane 
states have provided for 
discovery in criminal cases, 
apart f rcm the preliainary 
examination utah has not. 
Thus, the occasion which it 
affords for the pre-trial 
examination of witnesses 
upon compulsory process ia 
a unique and irretrievable 
opportunity for the defenae. 
Mor would it seem that a rule 
of prejudicial error can be 
applied in this context, for 
-25-
"it is forever unknowable what 
information counsel might have 
gleaned frcn the preliminary 
examination. " 
It is clear from the Hamilton decision• 
'·and other decisions in the same line of cases 
i 
I that the court does not look to whether or not 
\~e accused was prejudiced by his lack of 
I counsel. The mere fact that his constitu-
tional rights were denied is sufficient 
reason to overrule the judgment of the trial 
court. 
-26-
l 
' I 
I CONCLUSION 
f Appellant sho11191d by creditable evi-
11oence in the Court below that he was depri-
~ed of his constitutional right to the ad-
~vice of counsel at the critical stages of 
,, 
the criminal proceedings against him. Counsel 
as not appointed for him until the proceed-
~ngs had reached the District Court level. 
y that time, matters which may have materially 
tided his defense had already been lost to him 
11
nd it must be presumed that he was prejudiced 
I 
j 
Appellant respectfully submits that 
e trial court erred in concluding that he 
ad been deprived of no constitutional rights 
-27-
and dismissing his Complaint for writ of 
t eabeas corpus • The trial court should be 
reversed and appellant's Writ of Habeas 
corpus granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
• ··- -----:7 ... 
/ --~-~ ,p- / ~. / 
/.-::-r ~ ~~-- ~~~~'--
F. ALAN FLETCHER 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for appellant. 
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